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Is Physician-Assisted Suicide Possible?
John M. Dolan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most reflective individuals feel a deep sense of moral distress
when contemplating the deliberate destruction of a human being.
Many react thus even when the killing is of someone convicted of
a capital offense and the destruction is being carried out in
accordance with procedures specified by law. Understandably, a
still greater number of individuals feel profound moral distress
when contemplating the deliberate killing of a human being who
is neither engaged in a lethal assault nor convicted of a capital
offense; that is, the deliberate killing of a human being who is
"innocent" in the classical sense of the term.1 Deliberate killings
of this sort have historically been strictly prohibited by law (at
least until the aberrations of the present century, which began,
but did not end, when the killing programs of the Third Reich
targeted, among others, unarmed citizens of the Reich itself).2
Beyond the moral repugnance aroused by deliberate killing of
the innocent, most persons however unreflective feel a particular
moral discomfort when contemplating the prospect of a physician
engaged in an act of deliberate killing.3 In this instance, there is
* Co-Chair, Program in Human Rights and Medicine Department of Obstetrics
and Gynecology, Morse-Alumni Distinguished Teaching Professor of Philosophy, Univer-
sity of Minnesota.
1. That is, "in- nocere," not engaged in harm; neither engaged in assault nor
guilty of a capital offense. Observe that a person is, in this sense, innocent, even when
guilty of one or more of the moral shortcomings we might discover in ourselves or others
in the course of our ordinary lives (shortness of temper, vanity, dishonesty, cowardice,
greed, laziness, gluttony, lust, disloyalty, callousness, carelessness, self-absorption,
thoughtlessness, etc.).
2. See, e.g., ROBERT PROCTOR, RACIAL HYGIENE, Harvard University Press, 1988;
BENNO MULLER-HILL, MURDEROUS SCIENCE, Oxford University Press, 1988; RAUL HI--
BERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS, Holmes & Meier, 1985; MARTIN Gn
BERT, THE HOLOCAUST, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1985.
3. Here it is interesting to note something said by Pieter Admiraal, a Dutch physi-
cian who has for years publicly admitted to deliberately killing patients (who has, indeed,
boasted of killing patients) and who has played a central role in the introduction of
euthanasia in the Netherlands. Speaking at a conference in Minneapolis in May of 1989,
this hardened killer reported that he removes his white coat before killing a patient.
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an almost visceral sense that the act is forbidden in an especially
powerful way. Although the case against anyone's ever taking
steps to end an innocent life is very strong and even overwhelm-
ing in the view of some of the gravest and most sober moral
judges, the case against physicians taking such steps is not
merely powerful, it may have the force of logical necessity.
Whether the prohibition against physician-assisted suicide
does indeed have such remarkable strength is the focus of this
article. One can, of course, raise many questions concerning phy-
sician-assisted suicide: For example, one can ask how often and
under what conditions such suicide takes place, whether the
practice is immoral, whether it should remain illegal, whether it
is a practice likely to have evil consequences and so on. All of
these questions presuppose an affirmative answer to a prior one,
however, namely, the question which is our present focus: Is a
practice of physician-assisted suicide possible? This question
may strike some readers as bizarre. How could there be any
doubt as to the possibility of physician-assisted suicide?
Thousands of citizens advocate the practice. A physician-
assisted suicide measure even won a (narrow) majority in a
recent state election in the United States.4 In Australia's North-
ern Territories, the practice has been sanctioned by law. In the
United States, a federal circuit court recently took the extraordi-
nary step of ruling that access to the practice is a constitutional
right. A reader aware of these facts may well conclude that the
physician-assisted suicide practice must, at the very least, be log-
ically possible.
The impossibility of something, and even the logical impossi-
bility of something, has never foreclosed the possibility of people
discussing the thing in question or of even trying to bring it
about. Think of the millennia during which mathematical
geniuses devoted intense effort to attempts to prove Euclid's Par-
allel Postulate from his other axioms and postulates. This could
not be done since it is logically impossible. The question whether
the practice of physician-assisted suicide is logically possible is
not determined by the fact that there are individuals who say
4. Ballot Measure 16, which won its narrow victory at the polls in Oregon in
November of 1994, but has, so far, failed to go into effect because of legal challenges
brought against it by several physicians and representatives of persons with disabilities.
5. Indeed, on the 22nd of September 1996, in Darwin, Australia, capital of the
Northern Territories, a physician named Philip Nitschke, acting under a belief that the
new law is valid (despite the widespread and bitter opposition it has engendered) killed a
patient by administering a lethal injection. According to Dr. Nitschke, the patient had
requested the lethal injection. NEw YoRK TIms, Sept. 26, 1996, at A4.
6. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96-110).
356 Vol. 35:355
Is Physician-Assisted Suicide Possible?
they want the practice instituted, nor by the fact that eight
judges of the Ninth Circuit Court signed their names to an opin-
ion which purports to discover a constitutional right of access to
such a practice.
Clamoring for a practice or uttering solemn declarations about
it settles nothing about its logical possibility. Logical contradic-
tions can easily be overlooked if, as in the case of the parallel
postulate, they are unobvious or deep. Less profound contradic-
tions can be overlooked by individuals speaking carelessly or
under the thrall of a vehement ideological conviction. In the
past, throngs have urged and even voted for impossible pro-
grams, legislatures have passed impossible statutes and courts
have handed down impossible rulings. Students of democratic
societies do not have to search far for examples of candidates
securing electoral victories with impossible programs, or for
instances of legislatures passing impossible statutes. One inter-
esting example of the latter case can be adduced without danger
of stepping on the toes of any living persons: House Bill No. 246,
which was passed by the House and Senate of the Indiana legis-
lature in 1897. 7 The author of the bill was a physician, Edwin
Goodman, who lived in the town of Solitude in Posey County,
Indiana (since the bill was in the strictest sense of the word, "idi-
otic,"' he could not have lived in a more aptly named town). Dr.
Goodman was convinced that he had accomplished several
impossible things; he thought that he had discovered how to tri-
sect angles by Euclidean means9 and how to square the circle.
Dr. Goodman believed that his "results" rested on his discovery
of the correct value of n. Dr. Goodman's bill offered his "discov-
eries" to the state of Indiana to be used in its textbooks without
any payment of a royalty to him. Citizens of other states were, of
course, to pay for the use of Dr. Goodman's important discover-
ies. As one deciphers the pretentious, ignorant and confused
sentences of Dr. Goodman's bill, one discovers that the confused
doctor has "discovered" that iT is not a transcendental number10
7. An account of this legislative fiasco can be found in PEm BECKMANN, A HISTORY
OF Pi, (1971).
8. The term "idiotic" derives from the Greek word "idiotes" which was used to
describe a person isolated and wrapped up in his or her own affairs, not focused on the
affairs of the larger community. It is the root of such terms as "idiosyncracy," a feature
unique to a particular individual, and "ideolect," the language of a single speaker, and, of
course, "idiot."
9. That is, a procedure which employs no other tools than a straight edge and
compass.
10. A number is "transcendental" if it is not the root of any algebraic equation.
Since the collection of all possible algebraic equations constitutes a countable or
denumberable infinity and the collection of all real numbers is non-denumerably infinite,
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after all, though he concedes that it is an irrational number.11
According to Dr. Goodman's crackpot calculations, n has the
exact value of 16/-, that is, to four decimal places, 9.2376. This
may be the worst estimate of the value of n in human history.
Four thousand years ago, and independently of each other, the
Babylonians and Egyptians worked with approximations of n
equivalent to 3.16, less than two hundredths from the correct
value. Dr. Goodman overestimated the value by a factor of three.
On the fifth of February 1897, nonetheless, Dr. Goodman's bill
was passed by the Indiana House by a unanimous vote and sent
to the Senate where it passed on an initial vote. Subsequently, a
mathematics professor named A.C. Waldo visited the state legis-
lature on business concerning Purdue University, saw a copy of
the bill on a legislator's desk, read it, and gave an emergency
tutorial to some of the senators. Bill No. 246 was referred back
to a committee and in the hundred years since its passage, has
not been considered again by the Indiana Senate.
Before investigating the logical status of physician-assisted
suicide, we might briefly note some features of the larger context
in which questions about physician-assisted suicide arise.
In a brief interval which has seen vast social, economic, techni-
cal and political structures across the globe altered with the
speed of summer lightning, the practice of medicine has under-
gone startling changes and is at this moment subject to conflict-
ing forces: some of which, like those pressing for physician-
assisted suicide, are pushing in the direction of radical moral
change. In the world outside of medicine, the destruction of the
Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of apartheid
in South Africa, the emergence of powerful (and sometimes ruth-
less) multinational corporations, 12 and the development of
remarkable and inexpensive technical methods of storing, trans-
mitting and manipulating information (personal computers, par-
allel computing devices, public key cryptography, the internet,
and so on) have all taken place in an historical blink of an eye.
Within medicine, the transformations have been as swift and diz-
zying as elsewhere with the introduction of astonishing thera-
peutic interventions, techniques of transplantation, genetic
probing and manipulation, and remarkable non-invasive tech-
it follows that most real numbers are transcendental. Lindemann demonstrated in 1892
that n is transcendental.
11. A number is irrational if (and only if) it is not the ratio of two integers.
12. These enterprises confound as much as they illustrate Thomas Jefferson's
remark that "the merchant feels no loyalty to the mere place on which he stands so strong
as to that from which he derives his profit." Jefferson did not foresee the archipelagos of
sweatshops that now blight the planet.
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niques of diagnosis, some of which would have been deemed sci-
ence fiction not long ago. Additionally, as these scientific and
clinical innovations have unfolded, movements have been under-
way to change the contract between the physician and society to
alter the very definition of the office of physician.1 These move-
ments are connected in interesting ways with other vast trans-
formations which have been underway in the United States, such
as radical changes in the arrangements of economic incentives
and disincentives in the health economy, dramatic shifts in fed-
eral health policy in the post World War II era, the move from an
industrial to a post-industrial economy, massive deterioration in
the stability and strength of family structures, attendant
declines in adolescent health and increases in criminal activity, a
relentless drive to stretch the notion of "health" (whose most
hilarious illustration is the latest edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual's listing14 of bad writing as an illness), the
emergence of powerful pressures to contain health care costs,
and still other forces and changes. There has probably not been
a time in human history when medicine has been subjected to
pressures more powerful than those currently bearing upon it.
Nonetheless, powerful as these pressures are, there is an abso-
lute barrier beyond which they cannot pass: they cannot cross
the line of logical impossibility.
The Ninth Circuit ruling mentioned above and a related Sec-
ond Circuit court ruling also handed down in the Spring of 19961
are striking expressions of one of the movements exerting pres-
sure on medicine. This movement aims to alter the practice of
medicine so that a physician is invested with the authority,
under certain circumstances, to deliberately kill patients.
Plainly, this is no small alteration: it is radical. Indeed, the pres-
ent task is to explore the question whether physician-assisted
suicide might be even more extreme than its proponents realize;
for it may do more than simply press against fundamental princi-
ples in our social order, it may press against the limits of logical
possibility itself.
Each year in this country, roughly thirty-two thousand people
kill themselves. Most of these individuals are male and almost
all are clinically depressed; that is, suffering from a treatable
13. One of these movements, whose success in the English-speaking world, at any
rate, is very nearly complete, was the movement to incorporate into the practice of
medicine an obligation for the physician to respect his patient's autonomy.
14. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM IV, 4th ed., Amer-
ican Psychiatric Press 1994, pg 51-53.
15. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, Vacco v. Quill, 65
U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 95-1858).
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medical disorder. Notwithstanding the impressions created by
journalists, it is very rare for a terminally ill person to attempt
suicide. The cohort among whom suicide is growing at the fast-
est rate is males over the age of eighty-five. An able Korean
scholar, who earned a doctorate in economics at the University of
Minnesota a few years ago and is now teaching in Korea, was
asked recently if he had considered the possibility of accepting an
academic appointment in the United States. The scholar replied:
"America is not a country to grow old in."
How does one settle questions of logical possibility? This
depends on the character of the case at issue. If an individual
reports viewing a naked boy wearing a green suit, it does not
require an investigation to perceive that the reported event is
logically impossible. Such a report is a contradiction in terms.
Many other logical impossibilities, however, are less transparent
and blatant. The object of this article is to determine whether or
not physician-assisted suicide is logically possible.
The phrase "practice of physician-assisted suicide," is short
and simple-looking but each word within it is a source of com-
plexity. The very first word, "practice," expresses a notion whose
logical richness has been appreciated more fully since the impor-
tant work of John Rawls four decades ago.16 The term "physi-
cian," besides the well-deserved glory which surrounds the office
it designates, trails with it a cluster of closely related concepts
("medical," "health," "treatment," "patient," etc.) and an intricate
network of constitutive rules elaborated over a vast history
stretching back two-and-a-half millennia. The word "assisted"
brings in notions of intention, causal efficacy and still other deep
and contested concepts. Finally, the term "suicide" itself turns
out upon inspection to be less straightforward than one is ini-
tially inclined to suppose.
The task of this article is to thread a path through the concepts
noted above, investigating them, and noticing some of the argu-
ments and conceptions advanced in the vast literature on
assisted suicide and euthanasia, a literature in which one
encounters a number of curious and fallacious patterns of
thought. The task of identifying and clarifying all of the notions
implicit in the idea of physician-assisted suicide is beyond the
scope of the present inquiry. Equally, the task of analyzing all of
the arguments in the literature on assisted suicide and euthana-
sia is outside the scope of this article. In this article, we under-
take only as much work as is necessary to answer the question
16. See John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," The Philosophical Review, Vol. 64,
No. 1, January 1956
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we have has posed. In the course of this work, we examine vari-
ous concepts and arguments concerning the practice whose logi-
cal status is at issue. In the course of our work, we describe and
analyze a few spectacular howlers which have not yet received
the attention they deserve. Proceeding in this manner, we will
discover whether or not the practice of physician-assisted suicide
is logically possible.
II. ASSISTED SUICME AND EuTHANASIA
If the practice of physician-assisted suicide were possible, it
would be a special case of euthanasia. Physician-assisted suicide
would be a case in which a person desiring to kill himself or her-
self seeks the assistance of another individual to carry out the
killing, an assistant who happens to have a particular profes-
sional background. Yet, how can assisted suicide be suicide?
This appears to be as logically objectionable as saying "Jim and I
carried the table up the stairs by myself." If Jim and I carried
the table up the stairs, I did not carry the table up by myself.
Likewise, If I carried the table up the stairs by myself, Jim was
not assisting me. Does the notion of suicide or self-homicide
carry with it the logical implication that the individual who kills
himself or herself performs the act alone? Apparently, this is not
so. An individual can be held responsible for the death of
another person even if he or she had an accomplice in carrying
out the killing. The judgment recorded in ordinary use of the
phrase "assisted suicide" is that the suicide victim can be deemed
responsible for his or her own death even if an accomplice helped
carry out the killing. It would be a mistake to declare assisted
suicide logically impossible. Though the phrase appears to fly in
the face of its own etymology, it has found a perfectly coherent
use in ordinary discourse. Declaring the phrase assisted-suicide
self-contradictory would be as foolish as invoking the law of non-
contradiction to refute an individual who says: "It is, and it isn't,"
when asked whether it is raining.
Dealing with assisted suicide is dealing with the case that
arises when someone decides to commit suicide and enlists the
aid of another individual to carry out the killing. There are obvi-
ous moral objections which need to be evaluated before one could
decide the acceptability of such an undertaking, but no logical
contradictions in the conception of such an undertaking. The
focus of this article is a problematic special case of assisted sui-
cide, whose logical status we intend to clarify: the case in which
the individual whose assistance is sought is a physician. In this
case, the assistance supplied consists in carrying out certain
acts, such as writing a prescription for a lethal dosage of drugs,
1996 361
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cutting off a patient's supply of food and water, administering a
deadly drug, and so on. All of these acts are intended to cause
the death of the individual asking for help. The physician acts
deliberately to cause death and does so on the basis of several
assumptions. One of which is that the person whose death the
physician is causing does actually want to die. Another is that
the individual in question has authorized the physician's partici-
pation in bringing about that death. These assumptions, how-
ever, do not exhaust those made at least implicitly. In order to
view the individual's testimony as a reliable guide to his or her
actual wishes, the physician must assume or ascertain that the
individual is rational and not encumbered by any condition ren-
dering the expressed wish for death invalid. The most common
encumbrance in such cases is the medically treatable disorder of
clinical depression. Furthermore, these implicit assumptions do
not exhaust those that must be made. In order to understand
what may be the most crucial assumption required here, we
must address the task of providing a formal definition of
"euthanasia."
What is euthanasia? The term "euthanasia" derives etymolog-
ically from two Greek words meaning "good" and "death." The
phrase "good death" by itself probably prompts as many different
thoughts and conceptions as there are persons who read it, but
the English term "euthanasia" has a quite specific meaning. Phi-
lippa Foot, the author of one of the more thoughtful essays
addressing the topic of euthanasia, 17 correctly criticizes one of
the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary's definition of the term: "a
quiet and easy death." This definition fails to distinguish eutha-
nasia from all sorts of killings which have nothing to do with
relieving suffering or granting the wishes of a terminally ill
patient. A murderer who happens to choose a painless method of
killing victims (slipping into their rooms and administering
lethal injections while they sleep for example) cannot be said to
have committed an act of euthanasia. Having dismissed the
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary's erroneous definition, Foot
goes on to make various remarks about euthanasia, some of
which we will call into question.
Any plausible definition of the term "euthanasia" must specify
at least three elements: (1) an act or deliberate omission on the
part of the agent;1 8 (2) a specific intention which accompanies
17. See Philippa Foot, Euthanasia, 6 PHiL. AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS (No. 2 1977).
18. Notice that there is something slightly odd in the use of the term "agent" here,
since our analysis covers the case in which the person who "carries out the euthanasia"
does so by deliberate omission, for example, by withholding a particular treatment biolog-
ically required to sustain a given life. That is, as used here, "agent" covers an individual
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that act or deliberate omission, namely, the intention to cause
death; and (3) success at causing death. These three conditions,
while necessary, are clearly not sufficient. A definition specifying
only these three elements fits all cases of deliberate killing. But,
Josef Stalin and Genghis Khan, whose mass murders were quite
deliberate, were not performing euthanasia. Clearly, a fourth
element is required if a deliberate killing is to count as "euthana-
sia." The task of specifying this fourth element is usually mis-
handled in the published definitions with which this author is
familiar. Philippa Foot makes the following suggestion as to how
the fourth element should be specified:
Let us insist, then, that when we talk about euthanasia we are talk-
ing about a death understood as a good or happy event for the one
who dies.'
9
Foot is more scrupulous than most writers on euthanasia, so it is
interesting to observe that even she euphemistically describes
the person who is killed as "the one who dies."20 Later in the
essay, Foot employs more honest and accurate language. Of par-
ticular import in the present context is Foot's specification of "the
fourth element" in the definition of "euthanasia." Her condition
is that the death brought about by the agent performing eutha-
nasia must be "good" for the person who is killed. Distinguishing
euthanasia from other deliberate killings in this manner has a
striking consequence: the term "euthanasia" might turn out to be
empty, that is, to have no application in the world. Defined in
this manner, the term "euthanasia" could never have any actual
application to the world, if it turns out that there are no cases
where an individual's own good is advanced by someone's delib-
erately killing him or her.
There are thoughtful moral judges who deny the existence of
such cases and would, thus, deny that euthanasia in Foot's sense
is possible. Some judges would argue this conclusion on the
ground that death is never a good, that the death of a human
being, however compromised and afflicted his or her condition, is
always a bad'thing, never a happy event for the individual whose
life ends. It is also possible, however, to argue against the possi-
bility of euthanasia in Foot's sense on quite different grounds.
who achieves an intended effect by deliberately refraining from action in order to cause
that effect.
19. Foot, supra note 17, at 86.
20. The unwillingness of writers sympathetic to euthanasia to use the word "kill"
to describe the action they view with sympathy is a fascinating area of investigation.
Foot, whose sympathy to euthanasia is strictly limited and hedged with very strong quali-
fications, does use the verb "kill" elsewhere in the essay we are discussing.
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The possible arguments at issue here depend upon attending
to an important logical distinction which escaped Foot's notice
and is not mentioned in the literature with which this author is
familiar. It must be observed that a moral agent willing to make
the judgment that death might be better than continued exist-
ence for a given afflicted individual is not at all committed on
grounds of logic to concluding from this judgment that it would,
therefore, be good for someone deliberately to destroy the
afflicted person. The distinction to which we are calling atten-
tion is the contrast between two quite different propositions:
(1) Given the degree of affliction from which x is suffering, it
would be a good thing for x if x were to die sooner rather
than later.
(2) Given the degree of affliction from which x is suffering, it
would be a good thing for x if someone were to kill x
deliberately.
It is quite clear that the first proposition follows from the second.
Since it is logically impossible for an individual to be killed with-
out dying, it follows that it is logically impossible for an individ-
ual to be better off killed but not better off dead. Thus, if
proposition number (2) holds in a given case, proposition number
(1) must also hold in that case. The opposite, however, is not
true. The proposition, "this person would be better off dead,"
whatever epistemological and moral difficulties might attend its
justification (and, as shall become evident, they are many and
deep) is compatible with the most scrupulous respect for human
life. It is a judgment which could be made in a particular case by
an individual who rejects every form of lethal action against
innocent persons. A moral agent prepared to make the judgment
that an individual is better off dead in a particular case is not
bound by logic to conclude that the individual would be better off
if deliberately killed. And it is precisely the second judgment
that must be made by an agent carrying out euthanasia.
To see that the judgment, "this person would be better off
killed," does not follow from the judgment "this person would be
better off dead," consider a hypothetical case. You might leave
your grandmother's bedside with the thought that, in her present
wretched state, it would be better if she were to die. Yet, at the
same time, and without any contradiction, you might react with
horror and outrage at the suggestion that someone, even some-
one acting out of motives of mercy, should kill her. Recall the
rage of Henry the Fourth after learning that Richard the Second
had been murdered. Henry had said that he wished he were rid
of Richard, but was furious to find out that Exton, attempting to
please him, had actually killed Richard. Henry stated, "Exton, I
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thank thee not, for thou hast wrought a deed of slander, with thy
fatal hand, upon my head and all this famous land.... Though I
did wish him dead, I hate the murtherer, love him murthered."
21
If the "better off dead" judgment entailed the "better off killed"
judgment, the utterance Shakespeare placed in Henry's mouth
would be contradictory, but it is not. Plainly, someone making
the weaker "better off dead" judgment in a particular case can,
without the slightest trace of inconsistency, strenuously reject
the much stronger "better off killed" judgment. The moral rea-
soner in such a case could reject the stronger judgment for any
one of several morally substantial reasons. Such a person might
appeal to the principle that the right to life is unalienable, and,
thus, that it is always a fundamental violation of justice to carry
out a lethal assault on an innocent human being, even one whose
life is blighted by severe illness or affliction. This principle, cou-
pled with the plausible principle that no one is ever "better off' as
the victim of a radical violation of his rights, yields the ines-
capable conclusion that no one is ever "better off killed," not even
someone who is "better off dead". Essentially, this same reason-
ing can be conducted in somewhat different language. In place of
the principle mentioned a few lines back, one might invoke the
principle that the deliberate destruction of an innocent person is
always murder. This principle, coupled with the principle that no
one is ever better off murdered, yields the conclusion that no
innocent person is ever better off deliberately killed; again, not
even someone who is "better off dead". Those who doubt the
gravity of the charge of murder might attend to Thomas
DeQuincey's warning: "If once a man indulges himself in mur-
der, he thinks little of robbing and from robbing he comes next to
drinking and Sabbath-breaking and from thence to incivility and
procrastination."22 It is grave business, indeed, that risks land-
ing one in incivility and procrastination! The logical facts illus-
trated here, establish by themselves the invalidity of deducing
the stronger "better off killed" judgment from the weaker "better
off dead" judgment.
The substantive moral principles appealed to in the preceding
paragraph are clearly potential grounds for blocking the infer-
ence that an individual would be "better off killed" from the
judgment that the individual would be "better off dead." Notice
that even an individual who rejects these principles must
acknowledge that the reasoner who invokes them does not
21. WLLAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING RiCdARD THE SECOND, (Robert T.
Petersson ed., Yale University Press, 1957)(Act V, Scene 6).
22. THoMAS DEQUINCEY, SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS.
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thereby become ensnared in contradiction. One can argue
against the principles. Undoubtedly, some writers would be
eager to do so. One cannot, however, refute these principles on
purely logical grounds.
An entirely different set of considerations also demonstrates
that there is no inconsistency involved in accepting a "better off
dead" judgment in a particular case, but rejecting a "better off
killed" judgment in that same case. It is true that certain ways
of treating a person accord with human dignity while others do
not. A moral agent who believes that an individual would be bet-
ter off dead might, nonetheless, deem it an offense to human dig-
nity for someone deliberately to destroy that individual out of
motives of mercy. Even a moral agent who believes that there
are certain cases where it is morally permissible to kill an inno-
cent person might find it an affront to human dignity to put a
human out of misery in the manner that one might put down an
injured horse or dog. It is a curious circumstance that, in current
popular debates, the phrase "death with dignity" is increasingly
associated with actions which find their natural home in veteri-
nary medicine.
For these reasons, it follows that, on Foot's definition of the
term, it is a nontrivial moral question whether euthanasia, at
least euthanasia of human beings, is possible, whether any acts
of euthanasia have ever occurred in the history of the world,
whether any could ever occur. This is a defect in the formulation.
This defect stems from Foot's incorporating into her definition
the assumption that it is possible deliberately to kill someone for
his or her own good. A wiser course is to frame the definition so
that it makes only the more modest assumption that it is possible
for an individual engaged in killing to believe that the individual
being killed will benefit from being killed. Interestingly, for rea-
sons independent of the present considerations, Foot considers
the possibility of amending her definition along these lines.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, she writes:
A second, and definitely minor, point about the definition of an act of
euthanasia concerns the question of fact versus belief. It has already
been implied that one who performs euthanasia thinks that death will
be merciful for the subject since we have said that it is on account of
this thought that the act is done. But is it enough that he acts with
this thought, or must things actually be as he thinks them to be? If
one man kills another, or allows him to die, thinking that he is in the
last stages of a terrible disease, though in fact he could have been
cured, is this an act of euthanasia or not? Nothing much seems to
hang on our decision about this. The same condition has to enter into
366 Vol. 35:355
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the definition whether as an element in reality or only as an element
in the agent's belief.
23
Notice that the sort of mistake which occurs to Foot is a mis-
taken judgment of incurability. It is a substantive and contro-
versial inference from a judgment of incurability to the judgment
that the person is "better off dead". In this passage, however,
Foot views the inference as automatic. It is not surprising, then,
that she overlooks the further, even more problematic, step from
"better off dead" to "better off killed." In any case, an enormous
amount hangs on the decision Foot mentions in the passage just
quoted. If we are convinced that the term "euthanasia," as
employed in daily discourse, applies to actual events in the world
and, at the same time, we entertain doubts as to whether it is
ever possible to benefit a human being by deliberately killing him
or her, then what hangs in the balance is the question how
euthanasia can ever occur. Sticking with Foot's definition
requires the conclusion that if even a single act of killing counts
as "euthanasia," then a fortiori someone has benefitted from
being deliberately killed. Removing from the definition the condi-
tion that the killing benefit the individual killed and placing it in
the thoughts of the killer has the consequence that the possibility
of euthanasia becomes straightforward and uncontroversial.
Defined in this manner, euthanasia is possible even if it is impos-
sible to kill someone for his own good, because the reformulated
definition requires only that the killer believe that he is benefit-
ing the person he is killing.
Thus, bearing in mind that euthanasia often involves killing
creatures belonging to other species, recalling the three neces-
sary conditions with which we started, and introducing a fourth
condition which attributes the belief just mentioned to the per-
son carrying out the killing, a fairly compact definition can be
formulated:
Euthanasia is any act or deliberate omission undertaken with the
specific intention of causing the death of another creature and actu-
ally causing that death, where the agent acts or deliberately forbears
from action on the basis of a conviction that the death being caused
will be good for the creature who is being killed.
Notably, this definition is entirely neutral with respect to the
question whether it is ever possible to kill someone deliberately
for his or her own good.
Before leaving the topic of euthanasia, it is useful to record a
few further observations about the judgment which underlies
any performance of euthanasia. Under the definition just formu-
23. Foot, supra note 6, at 87.
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lated, an agent carrying out euthanasia must be making the logi-
cally stronger of the two judgments distinguished earlier. An
agent who confines himself or herself to the weaker judgment,
namely, "death would be good for this person," falls short of the
thought that is at work in euthanasia because the euthanasiast24
agent is killing a creature he or she judges to be in need of death
and to fulfill the conditions of our definition (or of Foot's, for that
matter), the agent must be acting on the basis of the conviction
that "the death being caused will be good for the creature who is
being killed." But, the death being caused is being deliberately
caused; that is, it is a death which is the result of deliberate kill-
ing. Thus, the agent must be making the stronger of the two
judgments distinguished above. The judgment that someone is
better off killed might, in the language of the Third Reich, be
expressed: "We have here a case of lebensunwertes Leben (life
unworthy of life)."
Various reasons for rejecting the possibility of lebensunwertes
Leben (in this sense) have already been discussed, but there is
more to be learned concerning judgments of this sort. In fact, a
great deal more could be learned about these judgments even if
the examination was confined to important features of the
weaker ("better off dead") judgment. Since the weaker proposi-
tion is logically entailed by the stronger one, any difficulties
uncovered concerning the weaker proposition automatically
apply to the stronger one. In the following paragraphs, both the
"better off dead" and "better off killed" judgments will be consid-
ered. There are several additional points concerning these judg-
ments worth noting.
The first point to observe is that each judgment presupposes
something that does not exist, namely, a standard for judging
lives, a criterion for determining when a life is no longer worth
living. The "better off killed" judgment requires an additional
condition specifying when the possessor of a life is no longer pro-
tected by the general prohibition against murder. From time to
time in the literature, one comes upon unballasted essays in
which writers attempt to supply criteria which determine
whether a life is worth living. Joseph Fletcher's efforts in this
direction come to mind. Two problems attend these projects.
First, the standards proposed do not survive careful scrutiny. In
the second place, there is nothing remotely approaching a con-
sensus, even among the minority of writers attracted to the task
of attempting to formulate such criteria, not to mention the total
24. This term appears in Yale Kamisar's article, Some Non-Religious Views
Against Proposed "Mercy.Killing" Legislation, 42 MnqN. L. REv. 969, 978 (1958).
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lack of a consensus among the larger group of writers and think-
ers who find the very project of articulating such standards
either misguided or morally reprehensible or both.
Second, the judgment that an individual would be better off
dead and the judgment that an individual would be better off
deliberately killed are not medical judgments. There is no
clinical rotation in any medical curriculum devoted to the topic,
"lives so compromised that it would be better if they ended," nor
is there a clinical rotation devoted to the topic, "lives so compro-
mised that deliberate killing of their possessors would be prefer-
able to allowing them to continue." Both of these judgments are
moral judgments, not medical judgments. Moreover, the judg-
ments are moral judgments which, for reasons that will emerge
in the course of the present study, could not be introduced into a
medical school curriculum without logical collision with the
remainder of the curriculum.
Third, even if there was a standard by which judgments such
as these could be made, it cannot be assumed that anyone would
be able to apply the standard, because it would be impossible to
acquire the necessary information about a given life to determine
whether or not the standard applied. It is easy enough to state
the standard which an integer must satisfy if it is to count as
prime (it must be greater than one and not divisible by any inte-
gers other than one and itself), but it can be extremely difficult to
determine whether a particular integer is prime. For example, is
5,713,347,371 prime? The standard is clear. No emotions or mys-
teries intrude. All that is at issue is a fact about an integer, but
it is possible that even the use of a high performance computing
machine would not enable us to determine whether a given inte-
ger is prime.' Consider how much more difficult it would be to
answer questions about human lives. The lives of other individu-
als are notoriously inscrutable. The lives of other individuals
possess a richness and inexhaustibility which renders them inac-
cessible to others in certain crucial respects. Moreover, one's own
life possesses an inexhaustibility and richness that renders it
inaccessible even to oneself. It is commonplace for individuals to
falsely predict their responses to particular circumstances. An
individual who declares "I'd rather be dead than in a wheelchair"
may be startled to discover that life looks awfully precious even
when one happens to be seated in a wheelchair. An even more
common blunder is utterly to miss the significance of one's
25. 25 Several ingenious implementations of Diffie and Hellman's system of Public




actions or life, for example, to imagine falsely that one is accom-
plishing grand things when one is pouring one's energies into
mediocre projects, or to be utterly unaware of blessings one is
conferring on others or the deep importance of a project in which
one has been engaged, whether raising a child or performing an
"ordinary" occupation with skill and fidelity. Thus, if, contrary to
all rational expectation, we were presented with a clear standard
for lives not worth continuing or lives best deliberately
destroyed, there is no reason to expect that any of us would be
able to apply the standard to his or her own life, much less to the
lives of others.
Finally, a fourth point which deserves attention here is that,
even if, contrary to fact, there were a standard for determining
whether a given human being is better off dead, and even if, con-
trary to fact, we had the knowledge and competence to apply that
standard, it still does not follow that anyone has the authority to
destroy another human being. If a standard existed for limbs
that were unworthy of continued existence and it was deter-
mined that a given person's hand was so malformed as to be
unworthy of continued attachment to that person's body, nothing
at all would follow about any of us acquiring the authority to
amputate that person's hand. How much less authority would
we have to amputate anyone's life?
III. CONTRAFACTUM INTERRUPTUM
The debates now raging over proposals to establish practices of
euthanasia or assisted suicide are more remarkable than many
participants seem to realize. If one listens carefully to the voices
raised on one side or the other of the vast controversy, one is
struck by a realization that all of the parties, however divided on
other points, share two extraordinary assumptions about the
practices whose merits are being debated. Before identifying the
two assumptions, it is important to recall some of the principal
reasons adduced for and against euthanasia and assisted suicide.
Since the reasons given in the case of euthanasia are nearly iden-
tical to those adduced in the case of assisted suicide, we will con-
sider the reasons as they are formulated in the context of
assisted suicide.
Let us begin with arguments in favor of assisted suicide.
Advocates of the practice point to debilitated patients whose
ordeals have been prolonged and difficult, who are suffering
physically and spiritually. Surely, they say, we can find it in our
hearts to allow physicians help these unfortunate patients end
their lives, if that is what the patients want. "Whose life is it,
anyway?" they ask. They argue that respect for patient auton-
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omy demands that the physician supply aggressive treatment if
that is what the patient wants; no treatment at all, if the patient
prefers that; and a lethal injection, if that is what the patient
wants. Thus, in their view, respect for patient autonomy
requires that we rearrange our practices in such a way that
patients who want to accelerate their dying can do so. The advo-
cates of assisted suicide also point to patients who, in their judg-
ment, are no longer truly living but merely lingering on in a
primitive biological life that is, in their words, "no longer recog-
nizably human." Surely, they argue, anyone whose prognosis is
existence in such a state is entitled to arrange for a more swift
and dignified exit. These advocates also assure us that the option
of assisted suicide is no more than what they would want for
themselves and for their own loved ones and no more than what
any of the rest of us would want for ourselves in the dire sort of
cases they are describing. Surely, if a swift, painless exit is
something we would each prefer for ourselves over a life of ago-
nized and possibly demented disability, we owe it to others on
the verge of such an existence to arrange for their swift, clean,
and dignified departure.
Opponents of assisted suicide, on the other hand, argue that
the acts that would be performed under such a practice are
intrinsically wrong and, further, that the effects of establishing
such a practice would be injurious. Enumerated with stark brev-
ity, their objections run as follows: If we institute a practice of
assisted suicide, patients will lose trust in doctors. Many
patients who request assisted suicide will be clinically depressed
and in need of treatment for their depression, rather than lethal
action against their lives. Others will be patients whose suffering
is the result of their not getting proper pain medication; what
such patients need are medications that will relieve their pain,
not actions designed to kill them. Still others who request
assisted suicide will be individuals with discriminatory attitudes
toward persons with disabilities who find themselves facing the
prospect of disability. "It is very difficult to fight an enemy who
has outposts in your own head." These patients should be receiv-
ing counseling for their discriminatory attitudes about disability
rather than lethal injections. And the list of objections goes on.
Greedy heirs may pressure elderly relatives to ask for the proce-
dure. Family members tired of hospital visits and care confer-
ences may push sick relatives to request it. Doctors may abuse
their new power. As a physician once remarked, if we allow doc-
tors to kill patients in cases that are hopeless, why, they may
start killing patients whose cases are not hopeless. Physicians
will be embracing a power over life and death that only God can
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assume. We will be instituting a practice of state sanctioned
murder. Further, the mere knowledge that assisted suicide has
society's sanction may push some persons with disabilities to opt
for it not because they want to die, but, because they fear they
are imposing burdens on their families. With mounting pres-
sures toward cost-containment, the practice could become a
means of disposing of poor and uninsured patients who are
likely opt for (or be pressured into) assisted suicide more often
than affluent and insured ones. Woody Allen points out that
"[d]eath is a very good way to cut expenses." We will inevitably
wind up killing patients who would have enjoyed full recoveries
if we had continued to treat them instead of causing their deaths.
Finally, a practice of voluntary assisted suicide can be expected
to widen inevitably, first, into a practice of voluntary euthanasia
and then, as the experience of the Netherlands teaches, into a
practice of involuntary euthanasia.
We could easily extend these lists, but will stop here, because
we have enumerated many of the arguments that can be found in
the literature (and one or two this author has not seen there).
These arguments are a mixed lot, reflecting diverse (in some
cases incompatible) background assumptions and various levels
of sophistication and insight, but each performs the valuable ser-
vice of directing our intelligence to a consideration which
deserves attention and analysis. Yet, with due respect to the var-
ious writers who have advanced one or more of these reasons, we
must observe that these arguments for and against assisted sui-
cide are in an important and sharply defined sense, superficial.
They operate outside of the practice they are intended to address
and, thus, fail to touch the heart of the issue.
Look closely at the language of these arguments. Irrespective
of the side they take in the controversy, they talk about "the doc-
tor," "the physician," "the patient," and "medicine." If assisted
suicide is at issue, the deliberate ending of a human life, how do
doctors get into the act?
It is remarkable that nearly everyone, whether in favor of
assisted suicide or opposed to it, agrees with Viktor Brack, one of
the architects of the Nazi euthanasia program, that, "[t]he needle
belongs in the hand of the doctor."26 Both sides of the assisted
suicide debate make clear that what they are arguing for or
against is a practice in which physicians are involved in killing
or arranging for the killing of patients.
26. Robert Proctor, The Destruction of 'Lives Not Worth Living,' RACIAL HYGIENE:
MEDICINE UNDER THE NAzis, 177 (1986).
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The assumption that physicians will be playing the central
role in any practice of assisted suicide, however, presupposes
another, even more basic assumption, namely, the one which we
are here calling into question: the assumption that physician-
assisted suicide is actually possible. If this more basic assump-
tion is false, then the real objection to physician-assisted suicide
is not that it would involve intrinsically evil acts nor that it
would have injurious effects of one sort or another: The real
objection, in that case, is that it is impossible.
Let us look at the first of the two assumptions just identified,
the assumption that any established practice of assisted suicide
will necessarily involve physicians in a central role. Whatever
else we may discover about this assumption, we can see without
too much effort that it involves an interestingly flawed use of
counterfactual reasoning. It will be worth our while to describe
that flawed counterfactual reasoning before we go on with our
main purpose, which is to determine whether or not there might
be some deeper flaw in the very idea of physician-assisted
suicide.
To begin with, we can ask why the Nazi Brack and everyone
else contemplating euthanasia and assisted suicide naturally
assumes that "[t]he needle belongs in the hand of the doctor." If
the killing is going to go on, doctors will do it or at the very least
oversee and supervise. Why?
It is not because doctors have technical skills which could, the-
oretically, enable them to kill people, though, presumably, some
of them could misuse their technical knowledge and do just that.
Still, we should not expect physicians to be especially good at it.
We can expect to find a great deal more sheer ability to kill or
supervise killing if we turn to former members of Central Ameri-
can death squads, retired underworld hit men, or even veterinar-
ians. Anyone setting out to create a class of authorized killers
would be making a mistake overlooking these people as a rich
source of potential killers. It is not because the doctor's technical
skills admit of lethal perversions that so many people assume
that a practice of assisted suicide would involve killing by doc-
tors. Neither does this curious assumption arise from the circum-
stance that so many deaths now occur in institutional settings
(nursing homes and hospitals) with the result that doctors are
often on the scene or in the vicinity when death takes place. That
is not why some people want to assign the task of killing to
doctors. Plenty of other persons are on the scene in those institu-
tional settings: nurses, social workers, chaplains, administra-
tors, janitorial staff. With the exception of some administrators,
all of these people need the extra income more than doctors do.
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Why not consider attorneys or philosophy professors? Both pro-
fessions are also represented in the corridors of the institutions
where most deaths take place. Both abound with individuals only
too ready to defend assisted suicide; very likely, some of them are
prepared to carry it out.
Hilariously, a principal reason why people want to assign the
task of killing to doctors is this: we trust them.
This is a spectacular blunder of thought. Over the centuries,
under the conviction that conferring compact, vivid names on
various blunders of reasoning will help us avoid falling into
them, logicians have given names to various common logical mis-
takes: "Denial of the Antecedent," "Argumentum ad Hominem.,"
the fallacy of reasoning "Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc," and so on.27
The tradition, however, seems to have overlooked the error of
thought involved in assigning to physicians the authority to kill
on the ground that we trust them.28 Before giving the fallacy in
question a definition and a name, we might look at a few addi-
tional illustrations of it. One of Lewis Carroll's characters, a lit-
tle girl, says: "I don't like asparagus and I'm very glad I don't,
because if I did I should eat them and I can't bear them!"
Another example involves a nonfictional child:
Once the present author came upon his youngest brother, then
aged nine, struggling to get a sneaker on his foot. He was lying
on the floor, his foot over his head, saying: This sneaker doesn't
fit me! And even if it did, I can't get it on!
In the preface to "Man and Superman," George Bernard Shaw
writes: "A lifetime of happiness! No man alive could bear it. It
would be hell on earth."
The present author calls this fallacy Contrafactum Interruptum
and defines it as follows:
The fallacy of reasoning Contrafactum Interruptum occurs when, rea-
soning about a counter-factual state-of-affairs, we enter in thought
the counterfactual situation that concerns us and, in the midst of our
reasoning about it, forget the counter-factual premise which defines
the state-of affairs in question and draw conclusions that are flatly
excluded by that premise.
27. For a discussion of the traditional fallacies, see Chapter 8 of JoHN M. DOLAN,
INFERENCE AND IMAGINATION (1994).
28. At any rate, the tradition overlooked this fallacy until Saul Kripke carried out
his penetrating investigations of modality and reference which exposed a wide range of
fallacies in the context of modal reasoning. Kripke does not bother to confer formal
labels on any of the modal misunderstandings he examines, but it is clear that several of
the thinkers whose reasoning he dissects are in fact committing the fallacy under discus-
sion here. See SAUL A. KRnim, NAMING AND NECEssrrY 49-53 (1981).
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This fallacy underlies recent work in analytical philosophy, such
as David Lewis's work on "counterpart theory,"29 and work, since
disowned, by David Kaplan on the false "problem of identity
across possible worlds," which he sought to solve with his
account of "trans-world heir lines.""°
What is more important for our present purposes, the fallacy
of Contrafactum Interruptum is precisely the fallacy committed
when anyone reasons as follows: "We can't give the awesome
authority to assist in the destruction of innocent persons to just
anybody. Let's give it to the doctors! They have been single-
mindedly committed for thousands of years to the protection, res-
toration, and maintenance of human health and life. Surely we
can trust them!" This is straight Contrafactum Interruptum.
So, the common assumption that assisted suicide should be
carried out by physicians rests on the fallacy this author calls
Contrafactum Interruptum reasoning. We are now, however, in
the course of an investigation whose purpose is to determine
whether a more radical blunder might be involved in that
assumption: we are calling into question the possibility of physi-
cian-assisted suicide. The path we shall follow is this: first we
shall attend to a fundamental feature of certain moral rules, in
virtue of which they are called "constitutive rules;" second, we
shall examine some of the constitutive rules contained in the con-
tract between the physician and society, a contract, which for
two-and-a-half millennia was embodied in the Hippocratic Oath;
and third, we shall address the question whether physician-
assisted suicide is possible. If the practice turns out to be impos-
sible, then the fallacy of contrafactum interruptum which we
have just described might be seen as a mere surface indication of
the incoherence of the idea of physician-assisted suicide, though
it may also turn out to. have an interesting deeper connection to
that incoherence.
IV. CONSTITUTIVE RULES
Tradition attributes a striking counsel to St. Thomas Aquinas:
"Beware the man of one book."31 A related, equally useful, maxim
runs: "To a man whose only tool is a hammer, every problem
looks like a nail." A number of writers who address topics in med-
ical ethics seem to be in the position of a man whose only tool is a
29. See David Lewis, Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic, 65 J. OF
PHni.., 110-28 (1968); DAVID LEWIS, COUNTERFACTUALS (1973).
30. See David Kaplan, Trans-World Heir Lines, TH POSSIBLE AND THE ACTUAL 88-
109 (Michael Loux ed 1979).
31. IsAAc D'IsRAEL IN CuRiousrrms OF LrrERATuRE, 1791-1793.
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hammer. In particular, they appear to labor under the mistaken
impression that rules and principles are all of one kind. The
result is that they wind up swinging hammers at objects that do
not even remotely resemble nails.
The writers in question conceive every rule to have the charac-
ter of laying down some restriction or constraint or guide for a
class of circumstances whose existence is logically independent of
the existence or adoption of the rule. For them, the paradigm of
a rule is a regulation like, "[d]o not exceed thirty-five miles an
hour in the posted area," or a rule of thumb like, "[g]et an hour of
exercise each day." Rules like these are guides or commands con-
cerning how one should behave in certain circumstances, where
the circumstances can be described without making any refer-
ence to the rules themselves. There is, however, a vast and
important class of rules, "constitutive rules,"3 2 whose relation to
the cases they treat differs radically from the relation between a
regulation and case regulated. The relation of a constitutive rule
to a case to which it applies is the relation of a clause in a defini-
tion to an object which falls under the definition.
Thus, a rule like the rule in chess that rooks always move par-
allel to the edges of the board is not a regulation of some objects,
rooks, which exist prior to the adoption of the rule. Rather, the
rule is part of the definition of what it is for something to count
as a rook. For this reason, the rule is called constitutive. Prior to
the formulation and adoption of the rules, there simply is no such
thing as a rook, no such thing as a pawn, no such thing as
"checkmate," and no such thing as chess. The rules of chess are
not regulations adopted to govern the behavior of already
existing objects called rooks, pawns, knights, and so on. On the
contrary, the rules of chess define those objects, by specifying
their initial configuration, their permitted moves, and the object
of the game.
Similarly, a rule like the rule that physicians are not to
divulge information acquired in the context of the physician-
patient relationship (or the corresponding rule concerning attor-
neys and their clients) does not result from applying general eth-
ical principles to the specific context of medical (or legal) practice.
Rather, such rules are constitutive rules which define what it is
for someone to count as a "physician" (or as an "attorney"). Such
a rule also partly defines what it is for an act to count as part of
"medical practice" (or "legal practice"). If one does not have a
32. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHmosoPmcAL REVIEW, (1955)
(where constitutive rules are called "rules of practice"); G.E.M. Anscombe, On Brute
Facts, ANALYsis (1955); JoHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH AcTs 33-42 (1969).
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body of rules which defines the practice of medicine (or law), a
system of rules that specifies the office of physician (or attorney),
there simply is no domain of medicine (or law) about which to
raise questions or to apply moral rules or any other kind of rule.
A field like medicine, unlike a natural phenomenon, is consti-
tuted by rules. It does not occur in a state of nature. If all we
know about an individual is that the individual happens to have
a certain amount of biological knowledge, and that, by applying
that knowledge, the individual succeeds in lending aid to another
individual, we do not yet have enough knowledge to know
whether or not the individual performed an act that belongs to
the practice of medicine. Mere biological "body work" by some
individual who has biological knowledge does not constitute
medicine. The rules that define the practice of medicine bear on
roles and moves that are logically inconceivable apart from the
rules themselves. The system of constitutive rules defines the
roles and moves in question. Constitutive rules do not regulate
or govern acts and moves which are logically possible apart from
the system of defining rules; rather, constitutive rules define and
make possible the cases they treat. Thus, the prohibition of
stealing is not an ethical rule which results from applying gen-
eral ethical principles to the phenomenon of owning property.
On the contrary, the practice of property and of ownership and
the very idea of "stealing" are defined by a system of rules, one of
which is that people are not allowed to appropriate or use objects
owned by others without their permission, that is, "stealing" is
not allowed. The concepts of "ownership" and "stealing" are
defined by the constitutive rules of the practice of property.
V. THE OFFICE OF PHYSICIAN
When we spoke of the practice of medicine earlier (in section
1), we referred to "an intricate network of constitutive rules elab-
orated over a vast history stretching back two-and-a-half millen-
nia." The rules in question, which define the official roles, duties,
privileges, and permitted moves which belong to medicine, can-
not be found in a single canonical source in which all are written
down explicitly, but there is a document, a very celebrated one,
composed 2,400 years ago, which has throughout its very long
history occupied a central place in medicine. That document,
whose task is to define the office of physician, is the Hippocratic
Oath, written by the man generally recognized as the "Father of
Medicine," or by one of his students. Historians have not the
slightest doubt as to the historical reality of Hippocrates, but it is
difficult to know which of the writings handed down to us from
his school were actually composed by him and which by his stu-
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dents. All of the writings in the Hippocratic corpus were handed
down by the school as works of Hippocrates. The practice of cred-
iting all the works and discoveries of a school to the master was
common in the ancient world. Thus, all of the discoveries of the
Pythagoreans were credited to Pythagoras.33 Historians adopt
the device of employing the term "Hippocrates" to refer to the
composite figure who composed the Hippocratic corpus and we
shall follow them. Hippocrates is credited with three major con-
tributions. First, he introduced scientific method into medicine.
Thus, he wrote of epilepsy, which, before his time was known as
"the divine disease," that the disorder does not have a supernatu-
ral origin, but rather natural causes like all other diseases. Sec-
ond, he transformed, or rather invented, clinical practice ("kline"
is Greek for bed; it derives from "klinein" meaning lean or
recline, from which our words "recline," "decline," "incline," and
so on all derive). Hippocrates instructed his students to pay care-
ful attention to much more than the particular physical symp-
toms that prompt the patient to seek help. They were to observe
the patient very carefully and to investigate the patient's diet,
the climate in which the patient lives, and the entire context in
which the patient developed the symptoms in question. Thus,
Hippocrates initiated the practice of taking careful case histories,
and the meticulous case histories he drew up have survived and
can be studied with profit by contemporary physicians. Hip-
pocrates is also the author of one of the most powerful sentences
in world literature. Often quoted only in part, it reads: "Life is
short; the art long; experiment dangerous; opportunity fleeting;
and judgment, difficult."
Hippocrates's third major contribution, our present concern,
was to formulate the Oath which has provided the principal defi-
nition of the office of physician for 2,400 years. The definition in
question has not been entirely static over that period of more
than two millennia. Two ancient provisions have been dropped:
the requirement that the physician share his income and wealth
with his teacher and the promise not to engage in surgery. The
version of the Oath which survived may have been one taken by
the people entering what we would call "internal medicine," or
the forswearing of surgery may have bound the learner only dur-
ing a novitiate period. Scholars have, so far, been unable to
determine the correct explanation of the clause. Again, not sur-
33. Young assistant professors of medicine are sometimes startled to discover a
counterpart of this practice in certain modem medical laboratories in which it is routinely
assumed that the name of the laboratory's head will appear on articles coming out of the
laboratory.
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prisingly, two constitutive rules have been added to the defini-
tion of physician in recent history: the first, a duty to keep
current on developments in medical science, and the second, a
duty to respect patient autonomy by speaking truthfully to com-
petent adult patients and allowing them to make informed
choices about the course of their treatment. That a few changes
took place over two-and-a-half millennia is not surprising. What
is astonishing is the remarkable stability of the definition of the
office of physician over so many centuries, in so many places, on
so many continents, amid so many cultures. In ancient times, the
physician swore never to take sexual advantage of his patients,
and abstinence from sexual relations with patients is still strictly
observed. In ancient times, the physician swore never to violate
the confidence placed in him by the patient, and strict confidenti-
ality is still a cornerstone of medicine.
One especially stable clause of the definition of the office of
physician is presented in a clause of the Oath particularly rele-
vant to our present concerns:
I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judg-
ment, but never with a view to injury and wrong-doing. Neither will I
administer a poison to anybody when asked to do so, nor will I suggest
such a course.
This clause, which until quite recently has been an unchallenged
specification of the office of physician bears a specially close rela-
tion to the inner nature of the practice of medicine. As a consti-
tutive rule, it does not present an ideal or a goal. It gives us a
clause of a definition.
Let us now look at evidence showing how some current com-
mentators fail to appreciate the logical character of the constitu-
tive rules contained in the Oath. Our first example is a
comment by Justice Blackmun in his Roe ruling:
Although the Oath is not mentioned in any of the principal briefs in
this case.., it represents the apex of the development of strict ethical
concepts in medicine, and its influence endures to this day.3
4
There is serious misunderstanding at work here. To speak, as
Blackmun does, of "the development of strict ethical principles in
medicine," implies that you are able to pick out a certain class of
workers, the "physicians," perhaps characterized by their knowl-
edge of biology and human illness, and that, having picked out
those workers, you can then address the task of attempting to
decide which "ethical principles" will be proposed to govern their
work, to define an "ideal" toward which they should aim.
34. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 116 (1973).
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The rules of the physician's code or any other professional
code, however, are not a set of "ideals" toward which the mem-
bers of some pre-existing group are encouraged to direct their
efforts. On the contrary, there is no way to pick someone out as a
"physician" or a "lawyer" in the absence of the constitutive rules
in the codes. Absent those rules, there are no physicians or law-
yers. The rules define the offices in question. It is not knowledge
of biology or illness which makes someone a physician, just as it
is not mere knowledge of law which makes someone a lawyer. In
each case, the role in question is defined by an intricate system of
rules. If you describe someone as a lawyer, it is not an open
question which obligations or duties might belong to that individ-
ual. Once you have described someone as a lawyer, you have
already settled a long list of questions about the obligations
under which that individual labors. The individual is, for exam-
ple, bound to honor client confidentiality. This obligation is not
an ethical ideal to which the attorney is encouraged to aspire.
Rather, it is an obligation automatically settled when the indi-
vidual assumes the office of attorney. The physician is bound by
a similarly strict obligation to honor patient confidentiality. 5
Blackmun's mistaken impression that the document which has
served as a canonical articulation of the central clauses in the
definition of the office of physician is "the apex of the develop-
ment of strict ethical concepts in medicine" rests on a serious
misunderstanding of the logical character of a professional code.
The Hippocratic Oath has functioned not as a lofty ideal toward
which practitioners are encouraged to strive. Rather, it has func-
tioned for two-and-a-half millennia as a definition, a specification
of the office of physician.
It is a curious circumstance that Blackmun said of the Oath
that "its influence endures to this day," even as he made the radi-
cal (implicit) proposal that we strike from the Oath one of its cen-
tral provisions, namely, the clause which bars the physician from
performing abortion. Whole libraries have been written on the
question of whether the Roe v. Wade opinion amounted to judi-
cial activism. Far less attention has been directed to the impor-
tant question of whether the decision amounts to an effort to
derange the medical profession. What is important for us in our
35. The requirements of client confidentiality and patient confidentiality each have
attached a narrow range range of strictly defined exceptions. Thus, a physician who
treats a victim of a gunshot wound is, in most jurisdictions, required by law to report the
episode. Even here, within the narrow range in which disclosure is required, the physi-
cian is not free simply to chat about the matter at the random, but, rather, operates
under strict standards specifying which government officials are authorized to receive
information concerning the case.
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present study is this: The assumption underlying Blackmun's
remark that the Oath represents an "apex of the development of
strict ethical concepts in medicine" is a false assumption. The
central clauses of the Oath have far greater power than a mere
proposed "ideal:" they define what it is for someone to count as a
physician, for an act to belong to the practice of medicine. Justice
Blackmun's remark notwithstanding, we cannot pick out doctors
in virtue of some characteristics such as their knowledge of biol-
ogy and human illness and then, having done that, ask ourselves
which moral rules or "ethical ideals" should be proposed for them
to follow. To characterize a person as a physician is already to
settle a host of questions about that individual's obligations.
Blackmun's error is repeated by countless writers. Examples
could be multiplied at will. Consider, for example, a comment by
Sherwin Nuland:
With the Hippocratic physicians, medicine as we know it began to
develop. Divorced from superstition and necromancy, devoted to sys-
tematic observation of disordered life processes, and committed to a
set of ethical principles that declared the physician's primary obliga-
tion to be to his patient, it formed the trellis upon which subsequent
growth of medical thought could be guided.3 s
The first part of this passage conveys an undeniable truth: "With
the Hippocratic physicians, medicine as we know it began to
develop." However, to speak, as Newlund does, of the "physi-
cian's" being "committed to a set of ethical principles," once again
implies that there is a worker, the "physician," perhaps charac-
terized by possessing special knowledge of biology and human ill-
ness, and a question for this "physician" is to decide to which
"ethical principles," if any, the "physician" will be committed.
Once again, we find a writer who fails to grasp the logical force of
the provisions of an oath of office, someone who does not perceive
the special character of constitutive rules.
Not long ago, this author attended a lecture on the history of
medicine which touched on the Oath of Hippocrates. The lec-
turer, a distinguished physician, projected a slide displaying the
clause of the Hippocratic Oath prohibiting euthanasia and abor-
tion and said, "I agree with that." A curious remark to make
about a clause of an oath, a remark which invites misunder-
standing. A clause of an oath is not a request for agreement. A
clause of an oath is not an assertion to which the reader of the
oath gives or withholds assent. An oath asks for something other
than assent. One swears the oath or refuses to swear it. One
may legitimately ask whether a particular clause of the Hippo-
36. SHERWIN NuLAND, DocTORs: THE BIOGRAPHY OF MEDICINE 8 (1988).
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cratic Oath represents one of the constitutive rules of medicine,
but the constitutive rules of medicine are no more general asser-
tions about the practice of medicine than they are applications
of general ethical principles to the practice of medicine; the con-
stitutive rules of medicine define the practice of medicine.
The clause in the Oath quoted earlier reads in full:
I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judg-
ment, but never with a view to injury and wrong-doing. Neither will I
administer a poison to anybody when asked to do so, nor will I suggest
such a course. Similarly I will not give to a woman a pessary to
induce abortion. But I will keep pure and holy both my life and my
art.
37
This clause unambiguously excludes euthanasia. It proceeds
next to exclude unambiguously even the suggestion of euthana-
sia: The sentence after the two dealing with euthanasia
addresses abortion. It reads: "Homoios de oude gynaiki pesson
phithorion doso," which is translated above as: "Similarly, I will
not give a woman a pessary to induce abortion." One must exer-
cise care when interpreting this sentence. It is tempting to
explain the use of "similarly" (homoios) in this sentence as fol-
lows: The Oath is specifying that, just as the physician rejects
lethal action against a human being out of the womb, so the phy-
sician rejects lethal action against a human being in the womb.
That is, the clause absolutely excludes lethal action against
human life at any stage in the life process.
This gloss is certainly correct as far as it goes. To stop here,
however, would leave us with a puzzle. If we understand "simi-
larly" in the way just indicated, we are left with a puzzling asym-
metry. For on that reading, the Oath forbids even counseling
euthanasia, while, in the case of induced abortion, it merely for-
bids the act and is silent on the question of whether the physi-
cian might in some cases suggest abortion. The improbability of
Hippocrates's intending such an asymmetrical outcome prompts
us to realize that the term "similarly" in the sentence we are con-
sidering conveys more than our initial gloss allowed. "Similarly"
is certainly intended to call the reader's attention to the parallel
between renouncing lethal assault against human life outside
the womb and renouncing lethal assault against human life
within the womb, but it also intended to convey that the renunci-
ations in each case are exactly parallel. Just as the Oath has the
physician reject both performing euthanasia and even suggesting
it, so, in the same fashion, it has the physician reject both per-
forming induced abortion and even suggesting it.
37. 1 HnppocRATEs 299 (W. H. S. Jones, trans., 1923).
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The crucial question for our present purposes is this: "Is the
constitutive rule forbidding the physician from performing
euthanasia still in force and is the office of physician still defined,
in part, by that rule?"
We might prepare ourselves for the task of answering this
question by addressing another, namely, "is the constitutive rule
forbidding the physician from performing induced abortion still
in force?" The correct answer to this second question is independ-
ent of the answer to the one about euthanasia, but we shall
briefly consider it, nonetheless. Before we do so, it is instructive
to look at the treatment of the abortion clause by a scholar whose
discussion and translation of the Oath were, unfortunately, an
influence on Justice Blackmun. Ludwig Edelstein, in his Hippo-
cratic Oath (1943), translates Hippocrates's sentence on abor-
tion as follows: "Similarly, I will not give a woman an abortive
remedy." This is a remarkable exercise of translator's license.
The phrase "abortive remedy" is so alien to Hippocrates's concep-
tion of medicine, and so far from the actual language of the Oath,
that one is forced to conclude either that Edelstein has a moral
tin ear and a dismally incomplete understanding of the author he
is translating or else that Edelstein is such an enthusiastic sup-
porter of legalized abortion that he has allowed his enthusiasm
to overcome both his knowledge of history and his knowledge of
the Greek language. Since it is improbable that a scholar as eru-
dite as Edelstein could be simply misreading the Greek, the more
reasonable inference is that Edelstein has a strong bias in favor
of legalized abortion. It is interesting to note that Edelstein's
defective translation is the one quoted by Blackmun in his Roe
opinion. Even more significant is the fact that Edelstein's
unsound remarks about the status of the Oath are also quoted
with respect by Blackmun.
For, however limited Blackmun's grasp of the logical character
of constitutive rules, it is to his credit that he realized, when he
reached his decision in Roe v. Wade, that he was engaged in pro-
posing a radical change in the traditional definition of the role of
the physician and that he, therefore, owed us two things: first, an
answer to the questions, "why is the prohibition of abortion in
the Oath and why has it survived so long in so many cultures?,"
and, second, a justification of his proposed radical revision. The
unconvincing argument Blackmun advanced to support his
attempted undermining of the abortion clause in the Hippocratic
Oath8 is an argument he derived from Ludwig Edelstein, whose
bias in favor of abortion, as we have just seen, led him to mis-
38. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 116 (1973).
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translate the Oath. Following Edelstein, Blackmun attempted to
dismiss the Oath's prohibition of abortion as the influence on
Hippocrates of a specific "religious dogma" of an ancient religious
sect, the Pythagoreans. Wisely, Blackmun forbore from actually
stating the "dogma" in question, which was simply that life is
precious.
The weakness of the argument Blackmun derives from Edel-
stein is clear. A reader aware that the Oath amounts to a crucial
component of the definition of a special social institutional role,
namely, the office of physician, might without too much reflection
be able to think of one or two very good reasons having nothing to
do with Pythagoreanism (or any religious sect, for that matter),
why it might be a good idea to have individuals assuming the
important office of physician swear never to enter into a relation-
ship adversarial to any form of human life, and never to engage
in a lethal assault on human life at any stage in the life process.
Anyone undertaking to view the practice of medicine from the
point of view of the designer of a social institution is likely to
think of excellent non-religious reasons why it might make sense
to define the office of physician in such a way that holders of the
office absolutely and irrevocably renounce the possibility of tak-
ing lethal action against any form of human life; reasons which
anyone, utilitarian, deontologist, Pythagorean, non-Pythagorean,
atheist, agnostic, or theist would find convincing. One of the first
reasons likely to occur to anyone viewing the matter from this
perspective is the following. It will be crucial for workers who
undertake this important work to have the complete trust and
confidence of their patients. The physician will be asking the
patient to disrobe, to disclose intimate details about the patient's
life, to submit to the surgical scalpel, to ingest sometimes power-
ful and ill-tasting concoctions, to submit to unpleasant and
uncomfortable regimens, and so on. If it is understood clearly
and without doubt by everyone that physicians never under any
circumstances aim at injury or death, all of the necessary cooper-
ation can be reasonably expected and various crucial elements of
the physician's task become feasible. A second, wholly independ-
ent reason, however, can be adduced. Every art requires a
master aim. Confusion of tasks and potential conflicts among
competing tasks are to be scrupulously avoided in all settings. If
the attorney hired by a client had the option to also work for the
prosecution in the very case in which the client is a defendant, a
grave conflict of tasks would have been introduced. Henri
Cartier-Bresson spoke of the photographer having "head, eye,
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and heart in one line of sight."39 If physicians assume the task of
healer and protector of life, they have assumed a task of enor-
mous difficulty and importance, and it makes obvious good sense
for them to have head, heart and eye in one line of sight. If, in
addition to assuming this task, they are persuaded to take on
any other task, whether it be seller of pharmaceutical products
or authorized killer, they will be deflecting their aim, confusing
their mission, introducing potential conflicts of interest, compro-
mising their primary mission, and making it impossible to have
head, eye, and heart in one line of sight. Surely obvious consider-
ations of this sort are far more probable explanations of the
remarkable longevity and stability of the definition of the office
of physician than the conjectural initial influence of an ancient
religious sect. In any case, explanations as to how a term came
to be defined one way rather than another are in an important
respect irrelevant to logical investigations. We must not forget
that rules with definitional authority bind in a specially powerful
fashion: they bind with the power of logical necessity.
Let us return to the question raised a few paragraphs back. Is
the rule against performing induced abortions still part of the
definition of the office of physician? An uncritical thinker might
reason as follows: "The very fact that more than a million abor-
tions are performed by physicians in this country every year is
clear evidence that the rule is no longer in force." This quick
comment, however, overlooks something important: the million
and a half or so abortions carried out each year are performed by
a remarkably small number of physicians. It is extremely diffi-
cult to get physicians to perform abortion.4° Proponents of legal
abortion have been lamenting this difficulty for years, and have
recently acted to put pressure on residency program in obstetrics
and gynecology to incorporate abortion training in their curricu-
lums. 41 Fear of physical assaults by extremists is not a likely
explanation of the reluctance of physicians to carry out abortion.
39. Michel Nuridsany, The Moment that Counts, N. Y. REV. OF BooKs, Mar. 2,
1995, at 17 (quoting Carter-Bresson). Cartier-Bresson writes: "Photographing means rec-
ognizing, in a single instant, a split second, both a fact and the precise organization of
visually perceived forms that expresses that fact. It means putting head, eye, and heart
in one line of sight." Id.
40. The induced abortions at issue do not include those extraordinarily rare cases,
for example, ectopic pregnancies, in which it is literally correct to say that there is no
prospect of the unborn child's being born alive and that continuation of the pregnancy
poses a lethal threat to the life of the mother.
41. In the Spring of 1996, under strong pressure from advocates of legal abortion,
the American Council on Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) issued a ruling that all
residency programs in obstetrics and gynecology are henceforth required to include train-
ing in abortion techniques.
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The deep-seated reluctance in question existed throughout the
roughly two decades before there were lethal attacks on abortion-
ists by two or three extremists. Fear of damage to one's profes-
sional practice is probably part of the deep reluctance of
physicians to perform abortion, but such a fear if well grounded,
reminds us of something important: it reminds us that a large
number of persons, including a number who support legal abor-
tion, have deep feelings of uneasiness concerning a doctor who
carries out abortions. Far more important than the profound
unease others may feel about a doctor's carrying out induced
abortion, however, is the physician's own deep disquietude on the
matter. A cultural institution as vast and powerful, clearly
defined, and important as medicine, a cultural institution with a
history stretching over two-and-a-half millennia and an abso-
lutely central place in our lives, is not likely to be altered by a
report issued by a task force in Washington or by a few rulings
handed down by a single court, even the United States Supreme
Court. The widespread and deep unease about physicians who
perform abortions and the near impossibility of persuading phy-
sicians to enter into the business of performing abortions pro-
vides powerful evidence that the constitutive rule forbidding
doctors from performing abortions was not destroyed by the Roe
ruling, a Court decree whose history is not yet even a hundredth
as long as the history of the Hippocratic Oath; it is evidence that
the clause concerning abortion still has definitional authority.
Our concern, however, is the clause forbidding euthanasia by
physicians. We must address the question: "Is the constitutive
rule forbidding the physician from performing euthanasia still in
force, is the office of physician still defined, in part, by that rule?"
Here a response likely to occur to some readers is this: "The very
fact that there are thousands of persons clamoring for the insti-
tution of a practice of physician-assisted suicide is itself evidence
that the clause of the Hippocratic Oath forbidding euthanasia is
no longer in force." This response, however, may be as superfi-
cial as the one we considered earlier concerning the abortion
clause. Indeed, the reasons adduced earlier to establish the con-
tinuing definitional authority of the abortion clause apply
directly to the euthanasia clause or have counterparts which
apply to the euthanasia clause. First, the moral misgivings and
deep disquietude triggered by a physician's performing abortion
are matched by deep misgivings and disquietude triggered by a
physician's deliberately killing a patient, and there is strong evi-
dence that a randomly selected individual physician, whatever
the physician's declared view on the desirability of physician-
assisted suicide or euthanasia, will be extremely reluctant to kill
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a patient under any circumstances. Second, the considerations
about each art having a master aim, about the confusion and con-
flicts inevitably introduced by assigning competing aims to a
practitioner, apply here with equal force. The physician battling
to save your life, but also keeping an eye to the possibility that it
might make better sense to kill you, can hardly be accused of
having head, eye, and heart in one line of sight.
In the case of the euthanasia clause, however, there is an
important piece of evidence we are likely to overlook because it is
staring us in the face. There is, in this case, an interesting,
indeed, startling, possibility, namely, that the clamor for physi-
cian-assisted suicide is itself strong evidence of the ongoing defi-
nitional authority of the clause excluding assisted suicide and
euthanasia. The blunder of reasoning contrafactum interruptum
which we defined and analyzed earlier may deserve a closer look.
Nowhere on earth have ballot measures been introduced
attempting to institute "attorney-assisted suicide" or "philosophy
professor-assisted suicide." And the reason no such measure has
ever been introduced is not far to seek. It is because the
probability of success of such a measure is effectively zero.
Under our existing practices, a family has good reason to believe
a physician who says that the battle for a particular patient is
lost and that treatment should be stopped. Under our existing
practices, a physician is charged to battle for the patient, even
against steep odds, even at risk of personal injury or infection.
Therefore, we place considerable trust in a physician's judgment
that the battle has been lost in a given case. Under our existing
practices, which strictly forbid physicians from ever engaging in
lethal assaults, it is not entirely irrational to think that a physi-
cian who crosses the line and kills a patient whose case the phy-
sician deems hopeless must have been acting in good faith.42 If
the patient was in such irremediably bad condition that a physi-
cian killed him or her, the patient must have been in very bad
condition indeed.
Such reasoning, whatever its defects and shortcomings, has at
least some plausibility under our existing practices. It would
have none under a practice brought about by instituting "physi-
cian"-assisted suicide. Under such a practice, with deliberate
killing a routinized element of "medical" practice, the ground of
our deep-seated trust of the physician's motives and aims van-
ishes. People who would have fought tooth and claw against
42. Here, naturally, one excludes on grounds of irrelevance the lethal actions of
Mr. Jack Kevorkian, the former physician in Michigan whose resignation from the office
of physician is spelled out in a pile of forty-one mostly female corpses.
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establishing a practice of attorney-assisted suicide could be
expected to discover themselves in a terrible fix if they estab-
lished "physician"-assisted suicide. For it is reasonable to expect
that they would find themselves facing all the dreaded conse-
quences which made them oppose attorney-assisted suicide, the
"physician" of their new practice turning out to be indistinguish-
able in crucial respects from an attorney authorized to kill, but
they would at the same time have suffered an incalculable loss,
namely, the loss of a precious cultural heritage, the lose of the
practice of medicine.
There is a contrast between the constitutive rule which
requires strict confidentiality and the constitutive rule which for-
bids euthanasia and assisted suicide. A physician who deliber-
ately violates the crucial requirement of confidentiality does
something profoundly wrong, but the violation is possible only
for one who has taken a special oath of office, such as the nurse
or physician: no general moral principle dictates that it is
always wrong to transmit personal information concerning indi-
viduals with whom one is in contact. And there can certainly be
no general moral principle about transmitting medical or legal
information, since, in the absence of the constitutive rules that
define the terms "medical" and "legal," the categories are not
even available for discussion. Nonetheless, the designers of the
practice of medicine43 (or of law), could foresee that the sort of
activities they wanted to make possible would proceed more suc-
cessfully if they built in certain absolute constraints on officers
who would be operating within the practice. Thus, they could see
that it would be important for the persons who occupy the office
of "physician" (or of "attorney") that they have available to them
a rich supply of information concerning the persons who come to
them for professional assistance. Recognizing that many individ-
uals will be reluctant to disclose intimate or potentially compro-
mising information about themselves, they stipulated that the
office of physician (or attorney) has attached to it an absolute
obligation to forbear from disclosing information about clients
without the permission of those clients, thus opening the door to
uninhibited provision of information."
43. Speaking of "the designers" of such practices as medicine and law is to speak of
countless persons whose decisions and actions over long periods of time gave rise to the
practices we have inherited. To be sure, most of the persons involved in the process of
designing these practices did not think of themselves as designers of social institutions,
nor were the considerations we are here setting forth always fully explicit in their con-
scious thoughts.
44. There are, of course, certain narrowly specified exceptions to the prohibitions
on violating the confidentiality of the physician-patient or attorney-client relationship:
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Notice, in this case, what is at issue is an act (transmitting
information about the health status of another person) which is
in itself morally allowable for individuals who have not made any
special promises or sworn any special oaths of office. It is denied
the physician by the physician's oath. When we turn to the act of
killing a person who is innocent in the sense that the person is
neither engaging in a lethal assault nor convicted of a capital
offense, we are contemplating an action which is intrinsically
wrong, hence not an option for anyone. 5 It is thus not an option
to the physician twice over: once on grounds of law and morality
and again on grounds of logical necessity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Medicine is not a practice which was invented a few months
ago by a task force in Washington; it is, rather, an institution
which is one of the more remarkable cultural achievements of
our species. The constitutive rules which define medicine have
been in force for millennia; the definitions and understandings
they embody are deeply entrenched. Tinkering with them is no
casual undertaking. To remove a rule as central to the specifica-
tion of the intrinsic goals and inner logic of medicine as the pro-
hibition of euthanasia and assisted suicide is not so much to
change medicine as to abandon it. Not all revisions of our prac-
tices stand on the same level: some revisions are derangements.
Nor do all derangements stand on the same level: some derange-
ments amount to abolition of the practices into which they are
introduced. Any social role, any office, admits of modification
and revision. No social role, however, is open to all possible revi-
sions. At some point, revision slides into obliteration, modifica-
tion becomes annihilation.
A practice under which doctors deliberately kill patients is no
more possible than one under which police officers engage in
criminal activities or one under which firefighters engage in
deliberate arson or one under which naked boys wear green
suits. A practice under which "physicians" are authorized to kill
"patients" deliberately is a practice which has no physicians, just
as a practice which authorizes "police officers" to carry out crimi-
for example, when a physician treats the victim of a gunshot wound or a patient with a
"reportable disease," the physician is obliged to notify the proper authorities. Observe
that, even within this narrow range of exceptions, there are careful and narrow restric-
tions concerning the persons who are permitted to have the confidential information.
45. In an insightful essay, G.E.M. Anscombe, Murder and the Morality of Euthana-
sia: Some Philosophical Considerations, (pages 37 - 50 of Euthanasia, Clinical Practice
and the Law, Luke Gormally, Linacre Centre ed.), 1994), G.E.M. Anscombe asserts that
intentional killing of the innocent constitutes "the hard core of the concept" of murder.
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nal acts is a practice which has no police officers, or a practice
which authorizes "firefighters" to commit arson is a practice
which has no "firefighters." The obstacles to deliberate killing by
physicians are very steep indeed: they are logical.
Ignoring these logical obstacles leads one into trouble of a sort
illustrated by an article in the New England Journal of
Medicine. The article, which lists about a dozen authors and
deals with caring for terminally ill patients, contains a remarka-
ble passage:
... all but two of us.. .believe that it is not immoral for a physician to
assist in the rational suicide of a terminally ill patient. However, we
recognize that such an act represents a departure from the principle
of continually adjusted care that we have presented.46
Imagine a panel of a dozen experts on legal practice writing:
... all but two of us... believe that it is not immoral for an attorney
to engage in the deliberate incrimination and prosecution of his client.
However, we recognize that such an act represents a departure from
the principle of continuous protection of client interests that we have
presented.
Or a panel of a dozen experts on swimming safety writing:
... all but two of us ... believe that it is not immoral for a lifeguard to
assist in the deliberate drowning of certain swimmers. However, we
recognize that such an act represents a departure from the principle
of continuous attention to swimming safety that we have presented.
Deciding that, if we institute a practice of euthanasia or assisted
suicide, doctors are the professionals who should be authorized to
carry out or oversee the killing, is logically indistinguishable
from deciding that, if we ever legalize deliberate drownings, life-
guards are the ones who should carry out the drownings.
The constitutive rules which define the central core of
medicine and have remained fixed and stable over millennia bind
the physician to the good of the patient in precisely specified
ways. The physician is not given an airborne injunction to pro-
mote the patient's well-being, which leaves it up to the physician
or the patient to decide in what that well-being consists. Rather,
there is a requirement of strict patient confidentiality, a require-
ment that the patient be protected from sexual overtures of any
kind, a strict requirement that the physician is never to decide
that the patient would be better off if destroyed, a requirement
never to aim at injury or death, never to engage in euthanasia or
assisted suicide. These central clauses define the heart of
medicine, the inner nature of the practice. It is logically possible
46. Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill
Patients, NEw ENG. J. MED., March 30, 1989.
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for an individual physician to disseminate information about his
or her patients, and by concealing the violations, also to remain
licensed to practice. If the proper authorities discover the mis-
conduct they will act and their actions could include stripping
the individual of standing as a physician, but the individual may
remain a physician even after the authorities have acted on the
violation of patient confidentiality. In contrast, it is logically
impossible to have a practice in which "physicians" are author-
ized to engage in freely disseminating information about their
patients, because whatever else would be true of that practice, it
would, of logical necessity, not be a practice of medicine and the
practitioners would not be "physicians." Similarly, an individual
physician may out of mercy or malice engage in the deliberate
killing of a patient, and, by escaping detection, retain standing
as a physician. It is impossible, however, to have a practice under
which "physicians" are authorized deliberately to kill patients.
Logically impossible.
When we redesign the office of firefighter to authorize deliber-
ate arson by firefighters, when we revise the office of attorney to
permit attorneys to incriminate and even prosecute their clients,
when we revise the office of lifeguard to allow lifeguards to carry
out deliberate drownings, the time will have come to give serious
thought to establishing a practice of physician-assisted suicide.
Logical impossibility has a power which renders other objec-
tions otiose. And, as we saw at the outset, other objections to a
practice of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia exist in
abundance. Thus, for example, to enter an objection omitted
from the earlier list: Deliberately killing patients whose cases
are difficult will, among other things, rob us of the knowledge to
be gained by treating such cases. Many of the cases now treated
as routine are routine simply because, in the past, devoted physi-
cians, nurses, scientists, patients, and families battled on against
hopeless odds, usually losing, but in the process gaining hard-
won scraps of valuable information about how to cope with a par-
ticular illness or injury and, gradually building up a body of
knowledge which gave rise to today's routine treatments. Thus, a
practice of assisted suicide would do more than kill certain
patients, it would kill the growth of our medical knowledge and
prevent us from ever reaching a point at which currently hope-
less conditions can be treated routinely. And to repeat an impor-
tant objection noted in the earlier list, a practice of assisted
suicide would inevitably lead to the deaths of many individuals
suffering from clinical depression. A fact encapsulated in a perti-
nent bit of folk wisdom: "Suicide is a permanent solution for a
temporary problem." It can also be said against a practice of
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euthanasia and assisted suicide that it contravenes the dictates
of justice, violates the principle on which the legitimacy of state
authority rests,47 destroys traditional protections of the vulnera-
ble, treads with contempt upon the most fundamental tenets of
our moral heritage, deranges the medical profession, 48 and vio-
lates the dictates of common sense and common decency. These
objections, however, profound though the principles they invoke
may be, have the status of quibbles when set beside the difficulty
established here.
If Ballot Measure 16 goes into effect in Oregon or the badly
confused rulings of two recent circuit courts are permitted to dic-
tate future practice anywhere else, it is unlikely that many phy-
sicians will rush to avail themselves of the lethal power which
would be placed in their hands. A tradition as vast and deep and
powerful as the tradition of Hippocratic medicine is not easily
destroyed; its huge momentum would push us on for decades.
Such an immense cultural force is not extinguished by the pas-
sage of a legislative initiative, a couple of resolutions by some
professional organizations, or the disordered rulings of a few
courts.
But suppose our practice of medicine and our laws trans-
formed as the advocates of physician-assisted suicide would have
them transformed. Then the United States will have been the
birthplace for something never seen in this hemisphere: a prac-
tice of "medicine" which resembles medicine as closely as ants
resemble antelopes. The new "physicians" may inherit from the
practice of medicine certain costumes and a particular vocabu-
lary and a preoccupation with human illness, but they will no
more be practicing medicine than are actors in stage plays who
portray doctors. To be sure, we would still have men and women
donning white coats and wearing stethoscopes. These people
could further elaborate their costumes by wearing name tags
with the initials "M.D." after their names. They could occupy
offices and clinics and hospitals which were once the work-places
of physicians. They could adopt the practice of calling the people
who came to them for help "patients." (And some of those unfor-
47. In her paper, On the Source of the Authority of the State, G.E.M. Anscombe
argues persuasively that the source of the State's authority and the basis of its exclusive
right to wield deadly force is its assumption of a particular task, namely, the protection of
the innocent from unjust attack. This leads her to conclude that, "[t]here is one consider-
ation here which has something like the position of absolute zero or the velocity of light in
current physics. It cannot possibly be an exercise of civic authority deliberately to kill or
mutilate innocent subjects." G.E.M. Anscombe, Ethics, Religion, and Politics, 3 THE CoL-
LECTED PHMOSOPHICAL PAPERS OF G.E.M. ANSCOMBE 155, (1981).
48. If the thesis of the present article is correct, the derangement amounts to the
actual destruction of medicine.
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tunate people would be under the delusion that they were con-
sulting real doctors.) To make the masquerade complete, the new
breed of biological workers could even affect bad handwriting,
take to playing golf on Wednesdays, and insist that others
address them "Doctor." But, we would no longer have physi-
cians. The killers would not be doctors; they could not be doctors.
The consensus of all our laws and institutions and of the moral
tradition which has for several thousand years nourished those
laws and institutions is that a private citizen cannot carry out
homicide or perform acts of assisted suicide. These acts denied
the private citizen both by law and by morality are denied the
physician by an even stricter necessity: that of logic itself.

